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Cross border transactions are conducted using diﬀerent payment contracts, the usage
of which varies across countries and over time. In this paper I build a model that
can explain this observation and study implications from this for international trade.
In the model exporters optimally choose payment contracts, trading oﬀ diﬀerences
in enforcement and eﬃciency between ﬁnancial markets in diﬀerent countries. I
ﬁnd that the ability of ﬁrms to switch contracts is central to the reaction of trade
to variations in ﬁnancial conditions. Numerical experiments with a two-country
version of the model suggest that limiting the choice between payment contracts
reduces traded quantities by up to 60 percent.
JEL: F12, F3, G21, G32
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Transactions in international trade are conducted using diﬀerent payment contracts. These can
be broadly classiﬁed into Cash in Advance, Open Account and bank intermediated contracts.
Evidence suggests that usage of payment contracts varies both across countries and over time.
Current trade theory does not address these contracts. To understand why diﬀerent payment
contracts are used by diﬀerent ﬁrms and what eﬀects these have on international trade, a suitable
model is needed.
In this paper I develop a theory of trade ﬁnance that explains the co-existence of the diﬀerent
ﬁnancing forms depending on enforcement and cost of ﬁnancing, and analyze the trade-oﬀs faced
by exporters. The model shows that the impact of variations in ﬁnancial conditions on trade
signiﬁcantly depends on the ability of ﬁrms to switch contracts. Furthermore, it predicts that the
choice of payment contract shapes variable trade costs and that FOB prices vary systematically
with payment contracts and ﬁnancial market conditions. In a two-country version of the model
numerical experiments are conducted. I ﬁnd that limiting the choice between payment contracts
reduces traded quantities by up to 60 percent. In an extension I introduce repeated transactions
and show that these can explain the empirical observation that trade credit intensive industries
are less aﬀected by a ﬁnancial crisis.
While several recent papers have analyzed the eﬀect of the exporter’s ﬁnancial market on
participation decisions or exported quantities, none have examined the interaction of ﬁnancial
conditions in the sending and receiving countries. A setup featuring the choice of payment
contract between an importer and an exporter has not been studied before. Taking into account
characteristics of both ﬁnancial markets gives rise to interesting interactions. Depending on
which payment contract is chosen by an exporter, diﬀerent parameters of the two ﬁnancial
markets are relevant. Choosing a payment contract allows to substitute away from the least
favorable conditions. In a model taking into account the exporter ﬁnancial market only, this
substitution is not possible. Then, exporters are fully aﬀected by any changes of ﬁnancial
conditions in their market.
I model three types of payment contracts: Cash in Advance (CIA), Open Account (OA)
and Letter of Credit (LC). With Cash in Advance, the importer pays the trade before receiving
the goods. Under Open Account the importer only pays after receiving the goods. The third
payment contract considered is a Letter of credit, in which banks act as intermediaries resolving
1the enforcement problem.1
The main ﬁndings are as follows. CIA is more likely to be used if enforcement at home
is strong and if ﬁnancing costs abroad are low. OA is more likely if enforcement abroad is
strong and ﬁnancing costs at home are low. LC is used if enforcement is relatively weak and
interest rate costs are relatively low in both countries. Costs arising from trade ﬁnance take
the form of variable costs that are proportional to the value traded, i.e. they correspond to
the iceberg formulation often used in international trade. When ﬁnancing costs or enforcement
probabilities change, ﬁrms can react by switching payment contracts. In this respect, the time
horizon in which ﬁrms are able to switch payment contracts is important. In the very short
run switching contract might be diﬃcult. It could imply a ﬁxed cost, which would limit the
switching. However, in the short run it could still be easier to switch to a diﬀerent payment
contract between two trading partners than to switch bank for any of them.
When repeated transactions are considered, under certain conditions, trigger strategies can
improve on the one shot equilibria when CIA or OA are used. These trigger strategies are
more likely to be optimal when the expected number of repeated transactions is large and when
enforcement probabilities are high. In this case CIA and OA become more attractive relative to
a LC. This prediction is in line with the notion that LCs are used relatively more when trade
relationships have a shorter time horizon, whereas especially OA is more common in long term
relationships. It can also explain the ﬁnding that trade relationships, in which more trade credit,
i.e CIA and OA, is used, might be less aﬀected by ﬁnancial crisis than relationships using trade
credit less intensively, as reported by Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2009).
The model predicts asymmetric reactions of trade ﬂows to ﬁnancial turmoil. If there is
country-speciﬁc ﬁnancial turmoil, ﬁrms are able to partially mitigate adverse eﬀects by switching
payment contracts. If there is global ﬁnancial turmoil that aﬀects both the ﬁnancial markets
of the exporter and the importer, this possibility does no longer exist and trade ﬂows react
more strongly to a crisis. This suggests that in the current global ﬁnancial crisis trade ﬁnance
might have a stronger eﬀect on aggregate trade ﬂows than in former more locally concentrated
ones. The model predicts diﬀerences between South-North and South-South trade volumes that
are absent in models on ﬁnancing constraints in which only the exporter’s ﬁnancial market
conditions play a role. There is an additional eﬀect of the choice of payment contract on FOB
1I represent all bank intermediated transactions by the LC. They usually involve banks both in the importer’s
and exporter’s country and the usage of some form of documentation upon which payment is being made by
a bank to the exporter. For an introduction to the diﬀerent types of trade ﬁnance payment contracts see U.S.
Department of Commerce (2008).
2prices besides determining a part of variable trade costs. As the payment contract arranges
who has to bear ﬁnancing costs, the payment to be paid by the importer can be discounted
depending on the timing of the transaction.
There are several theoretical papers that have addressed the issue of ﬁnancial market con-
ditions and international trade. Kletzer and Bardhan (1987) show how sovereign default risk
and credit market imperfections can result in diﬀerences in interest rates and tightness of credit
rationing in equilibrium respectively and thus create comparative advantage. In Matsuyama
(2005) the share of revenues an entrepreneur can pledge towards wage payments diﬀers between
countries leading to comparative advantage.2
Chaney (2005) develops a theoretical model analyzing ﬁnancial constraints in a heterogenous
ﬁrms trade model based on Melitz (2003). Firms have to ﬁnance their ﬁxed entry cost into
foreign markets through own liquidity and domestic operating proﬁts. Liquidity is introduced
as a second type of heterogeneity. He derives conditions on productivity and liquidity under
which a ﬁrm exports. Manova (2008) extends this model and estimates it using the methodology
suggested by Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008). She introduces a default probability
similar to the one used in this paper. While in her model there is a domestic enforcement
problem between a bank and a ﬁrm, in this paper the enforcement problems arise between ﬁrms
in diﬀerent countries.
Her model has been further extended to a dynamic setting taking into account capital accu-
mulation by Suwantaradon (2008). In Chaney (2005), Manova (2008) and Suwantaradon (2008)
only domestic ﬁnancial market conditions are relevant for the exporting decisions of ﬁrms. In
this paper in contrast the eﬀects of conditions in the ﬁnancial markets of both the exporter and
the importer, determined by the optimal choice between payment contracts, are analyzed.
Some articles study empirically the interaction between ﬁnancial conditions and trade. The
role of ﬁnancial development for trade in manufactures is studied in Beck (2002) and Beck
(2003). Using data from 65 and 56 countries respectively he ﬁnds that ﬁnancial development of
a country has a strong eﬀect on export volumes of manufactures and that this eﬀect is stronger
in external ﬁnance intensive industries.3
Some recent papers test for eﬀects of ﬁnancial constraints on the extensive margin of trade
using ﬁrm level data. Greenaway, Guariglia, and Kneller (2007) use UK manufacturing ﬁrm level
2The broader issue of institutional constraints, trade and outsourcing has been studied extensively. For a
survey see Helpman (2006).
3Svaleryd and Vlachos (2005) ﬁnd evidence on patterns of industrial specialization and ﬁnancial market con-
dition that point in the same direction.
3data and ﬁnd no evidence for a causal eﬀect of ex-ante ﬁnancial health on export participation.
French ﬁrm level data analyzed by Berman and H´ ericourt (2008) seems to point in the opposite
direction.4
There is a policy debate on the eﬀects an importance of trade ﬁnance in general and during a
ﬁnancial crisis.5 The eﬀects of ﬁnancial crisis on trade have been assessed empirically by several
papers. Ronci (2004) analyzes data from 10 ﬁnancial crises and ﬁnds evidence for a negative
eﬀect of ﬁnancial crises both on imports and exports. Iacovone and Zavacka (2009) analyze
data from 23 banking crises. They ﬁnd a diﬀerential eﬀect of a banking crisis on ﬁrms that
rely on bank ﬁnance versus ﬁrms that rely on inter-bank credit. This supports the prediction of
the model that inter-ﬁrm credit relations are an important factor for mitigating ﬁnancial crisis.
Evidence on ﬁrm level trade ﬁnance of African exporters is documented by Humphrey (2009).
Berman and Martin (2009) analyze how ﬁnancial crisis aﬀects trade and ﬁnd that disruption
from ﬁnancial crisis is stronger and longer lasting for African than for other countries. Using data
on U.S. imports, Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2009) analyze causes of the current international
trade decline and argue that trade credit did not play a role. I discuss in Section 5 on repeated
contracts how this ﬁnding can be explained and why trade ﬁnance might be more important than
suggested by this result. Amiti and Weinstein (2009) use data on Japanese exporters matched
with Japanese banks to study the transmission of ﬁnancial shocks during the ﬁnancial crisis in
the 1990s. They ﬁnd that one third of the decline in Japanese exports in that period can be
explained by the a bank ﬁrm trade ﬁnance channel. This conﬁrms the relevance of ﬁnancing
conditions on the side of the exporter. The theory proposed here suggests, that in addition to
this, there are eﬀects arising from the ﬁnancing conditions of the importer and the interaction
of the two.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a microeconomic model of the
choice of payment contract. Section 3 puts this model into an intra-industry trade framework.
Section 4 derives the general equilibrium and studies a quantitative example. Section 5 extends
the analysis to repeated transactions. Section 6 discusses implications of payment contracts
during ﬁnancial crisis, on trade patterns, and on FOB prices. Section 7 concludes.
4Other papers analyzing this are Berthou (2007), Espanol (2007), Berthou (2008), Stiebale (2008) and Bellone,
Musso, Nesta, and Schiavo (2008). Zia (2008) analyzes the eﬀects of export subsidies on exporting behavior.
Baltensperger and Herger (2007) test the eﬀects of export insuring schemes.
5See Stephens (1998), Auboin and Meier-Ewert (2003) and Auboin (2007). In the context of the current




There are three types of payment contracts available to ﬁnance trade transactions: Cash-in
Advance, Open Account and Bank Intermediated transactions.
Figure 1 based on data from IMF (2009) illustrates some survey evidence on the usage of
these diﬀerent payment forms.6 While Open Account seems to be the dominant ﬁnancing form,
the share of the other two groups is also quantitatively important. The survey suggests that
during the current ﬁnancial crisis the usage of open account has declined, whereas the two pay-
ment forms that limit the risk of exporters have increased their shares. This evidence is in line
with the prediction of the model that changes in ﬁnancial market conditions cause switches of
payment contracts. Evidence on the eﬀect of the crisis on the choice of payment forms in ICC
(2009) suggests that the current crisis might lead to a renaissance of the Letter of Credit. That
is, given rising uncertainty, ﬁrms rely more on the safest payment contract available, which
is the Letter of Credit. It is also stated there that 50-60 percent of China’s foreign trade is
ﬁnanced with LCs. This indicates that in a less ﬁnancially developed country like China bank
intermediated transactions are used relatively more often.
Here ﬁgure 1
2.2 Micro Model
The following section introduces a simple microeconomic model for the choice of ﬁnance of an
exporter. Besides transport costs, I consider two additional cost factors in international trade
relative to domestic trade. First, the time delay between production and the realization of sales
is longer for international than domestic transactions. Hummels (2001) discusses the eﬀect of
physical transport time while Djankov, Freund, and Pham (2006) analyze the eﬀect of time delay
from the factory gate to the means of transportation on international trade. Both show that
international trade has a relevant time dimension. The latter document that procedures speciﬁc
to trade across international borders are responsible for additional delays. Second, enforcement
at the international level is more diﬃcult than domestically.7 This can be due to diﬀerences in
6Unfortunately to my knowledge currently only survey data is available. Thus the numbers should be seen as
a reference point.
7Enforcement might also be a problem at the domestic level. In the model I abstract from this and analyze
only international enforcement problems. The enforcement probability is thus best interpreted as representing
5legal traditions, working languages or the limited willingness of countries to enforce international
contracts to the same extent as national ones.8 Due to the two additional sources of costs in
international trade, time delay and enforcement problems, the choice of a payment contract is
a determinant of variable trade costs.
Timing The three payment contracts diﬀer in the timing of payments relative to the delivery
of goods and the amount of risk that is incurred by the exporter and the importer respectively.
Suppose there is one exporter and one importer. The exporter can make a take it or leave it
oﬀer to the importer.9 There are two points in time. One before production, transport and sales
and one afterwards. If producing, the exporter incurs production cost K at t = 1. If importing
the importer realizes sales revenues of R at t =2 . 10
First consider only CIA and OA. The diﬀerence between these two forms of ﬁnance is whether
the payment is made before or after realization of the revenues. If the importer pays before the
exporter delivers the goods, I call it CIA. If the importer pays after receiving the goods and
realizing sales revenues, I call it OA.11 A third option is a bank-intermediated payment contract.
As discussed above, I represent all contracts belonging to this group by a Letter of Credit. This
is an instrument oﬀered by ﬁnancial institutions to improve security in international trade. First
the importer pays the amount due in advance to a local bank.12 This bank then transfers the
money to the bank of the exporter, which upon receipt of delivery documents pays out the money
received. Assuming full enforcement at the bank level, a LC completely solves the enforcement
the additional enforcement problems arising in the international context.
8A complementary factor to the enforcement risk could be individual ﬁrm default. As counter-party risks can
be hard to observe across borders, whether a trading partner will turn out to be insolvent or illiquid can be seen
as a random variable from the point of view of the other party. Diﬀerent to international enforcement risk though,
the probability of failure of a ﬁrm would have an eﬀect on the interest rate a ﬁrm is charged.
9In my analysis I give all negotiation power to the exporter. This leads to the result that under open account
there are positive expected proﬁts for the importer. If the importer would have all negotiation power then there
would be positive expected exporter proﬁts under CIA. There could also be some type of intermediate surplus
sharing rules. The main mechanism of the model is driven by ﬁnancing costs and enforcement and should not be
aﬀected by the distribution of negotiation power.
10In this part of the paper trade transactions in the model are one shot games. There is a large literature
analyzing advantages of trade credit due to repeated transactions and supply-chain relationships. See Petersen
and Rajan (1997), Biais and Gollier (1997), Wilner (2000), Burkart and Ellingsen (2004), Cunat (2007) and
Fabbri and Menichini (forthcoming). In section 5, I introduce a survival probability of trade relationships and
analyze under which conditions a simple trigger strategy can be implemented to improve upon the equilibrium of
the one shot game.
11One could also think about intermediate types of contracts combining elements of both CIA and OA. Evidence
does not suggest that these are used very much though. In the oﬃcial brochure of the U.S. Department of
Commerce (U.S. Department of Commerce (2008)) e.g. no intermediate forms are mentioned. One reason for a
limited usage of these might be legal considerations, as ownership claims would be less clear.
12Often ﬁrms do not actually pay the amount to the bank in cash, but receive a credit for the amount and
period of the LC against a fee. As I assume perfect enforcement in the domestic ﬁnancial market, the two are
equivalent as long as ﬁrms discount at the lending rate.
6problem.13 A LC implies additional costs as there are advance ﬁnance requirements for both
the exporter and the importer plus any additional fees charged by the banks for oﬀering LCs.14
The choice between these three forms of ﬁnancing is relevant because of two imperfections
in ﬁnancing costs and enforcement.
Interest rates I assume that ﬁnancial markets to ﬁnance international trade are segmented
between countries and that the eﬃciencies of ﬁnancial intermediaries in these countries diﬀer.
As a result interest rates to ﬁnance trade faced by ﬁrms in diﬀerent countries can diﬀer. In
Appendix B I discuss a simple model rationalizing the diﬀerent interest rates. There, both
countries are small open economies facing a world interest rate. Due to segmented markets
regarding credit at the ﬁrm level, diﬀerences in the eﬃciency of the ﬁnancial intermediaries lead
to diﬀerences between interest rates faced by ﬁrms in the two countries. Given this imperfection,
ceteris paribus, it is optimal for the ﬁrm located in the country with the lower interest rate to
ﬁnance a transaction.
Enforcement There is limited enforcement of contracts in two ways. First, there is an exoge-
nous country-speciﬁc probability that a contract will be enforced, in the case that a ﬁrm does not
want to fulﬁll it voluntarily.15 In the case of CIA, it is the probability that the exporter is forced
to deliver the goods after receiving the payment. In the case of OA, it is the probability that
an importer has to pay the agreed upon price for the goods after receiving and selling them.16
Second, the amount speciﬁed in the contract to be paid by the importer for the goods imported
cannot exceed their total value at market prices.17 The imperfection of limited enforcement
leads, ceteris paribus, to ﬁnance being optimally done by the ﬁrm in the country with lower
13This assumption will be relaxed in section 6 where changes in the national default risk will be explicitly
allowed for.
14In the current version of the model I do not introduce any additional fees on top of the interest rates being
charged to ﬁrms. Introducing a fee would make LCs less attractive. If during a crisis this fee changed to a
diﬀerent degree than interest rates, this would have an eﬀect on the optimal choice of payment contracts and thus
on outcomes of the model.
15This captures the reduced form of an enforcement game played between the importer and the exporter, which
is aﬀected by the legal institutions of the two countries. This could be extended to a model in which ﬁrms choose
their legal expenditures to achieve or prevent enforcement. In that case the enforcement probability would change
with the value at stake.
16For simplicity these two enforcement probabilities are assumed to be equal. It would be an interesting
extension to consider an asymmetry here. This could be rationalized by the diﬀerence between the in-kind nature
of an OA trade credit versus the cash nature of a CIA credit. For a formalization of this argument see Burkart
and Ellingsen (2004).
17In order to enforce a trade contract in court the value speciﬁed in the contract has to be in some proportion to
the real value of the goods traded. Technically this assumption is necessary in order for imperfect enforcement to
have an eﬀect on outcomes in the open account case. If this condition does not bind, any changes in enforcement
risk would be oﬀset by a proportional increase in the period 2 payment C
OA.
7enforcement. Finally, LCs are used when enforcement problems are so large that they outweigh
ﬁnancing costs in the form of interest payments.
Thus, for moderate levels of enforcement problems, trade is, ceteris paribus, ﬁnanced by the
country with the lower interest rate and with the lower contract enforcement. If the two factors,
interest rate costs and enforcement probabilities, can be found in diﬀerent combinations across
countries, this makes the choice of the ﬁnancing form non-trivial. In the following I formally
describe the three mentioned ﬁnancing forms and derive conditions under which ﬁrms choose
one of them over the others.
Cash in advance Under cash in advance the importer ﬁrst pays an amount CCIA to the
exporter. Then with probability λ the contract is enforced. In this case the exporter produces
the goods at cost K and delivers them to the importer, who sells them for R. The exporter
makes a take it or leave it oﬀer and has to respect the limited value of contract and the importer








= CCIA − λK,






= λR − (1 + r∗)CCIA ≥ 0. (participation constraint importer)
Under CIA the trade transaction is ﬁnanced by the importer. The exporter receives the
payment before production and delivery of the product. There is the possibility that the exporter
keeps the money and does not deliver the good. This happens with the exogenous probability
of non-enforcement 1 − λ. The participation constraint of the importer assures that taking the
default probability into account, the expected proﬁts of the importer are non-negative and thus
the importer is willing to agree on the trade and to pre-ﬁnance it. As all negotiation power lies
with the exporter and the limited value of contract never binds under CIA, the participation
constraint binds under the optimal contract. The optimal payment CCIA and optimal expected










1+r∗R − λK. (1)
8Note that λ appears in the optimal payment CCIA. Thus the importer’s payment is dis-
counted by the probability of non-payment by the exporter. Under CIA production and delivery
only takes place with probability λ.
Open account Under open account ﬁrst the exporter produces the goods at cost K and then
delivers them to the importer. Next, the importer sells the goods for R. With probability λ∗
the contract is enforced and the importer pays the amount COA to the exporter.











(λ∗COA − K(1 + r)),








1+r∗(R − λ∗COA) ≥ 0, (participation constraint importer)
assuming that the exporter and importer discount proﬁts with their local interest rates.18
Now, the exporter pre-ﬁnances the trade interaction. The importer receives the goods before
payment. With probability 1 − λ∗ the importer is not forced to pay the exporter. Due to the
limited value of contract constraint the maximum payment COA that is contractible is the sales
value of the product R. Under this maximum payment the exporter is not able to extract all
rents from the importer. Thus under open account the importer has positive ex-ante expected
proﬁts. There is no contract that allows the exporter to extract all surplus.19 The optimal
payment amount COA and the optimal discounted expected exporter proﬁts can be derived as:








R − K. (2)
Letter of credit Under LC the ﬁnancial transaction is secured via a bank in the country of
the exporter and the importer, respectively. Under the assumption of no default at the bank
level, this completely resolves the enforcement problem at the individual contract level20. The
18In order to be able to compare proﬁts between CIA and OA they have to be discounted to the same time
period.
19This is true for any ﬁnite upper bound on the contractible payment level. Without an upper bound any
change in enforcement probability could be oﬀset by a proportional increase in C
OA. It is conceivable though
that courts would not enforce amounts too disconnected from the real value of the trade.
20It is conceivable that full enforcement at the banking level is more likely than at the ﬁrm level. As banks tend
to have more long-term relationships, reputation building and repeated transactions ease enforcement between
them.











(CLC − K(1 + r)),








1+r∗(R − (1 + r∗)CLC) ≥ 0. (participation constraint importer)
With LCs both the exporter and the importer pre-ﬁnance the transaction and incur costs
due to interest rate payments. The contract enforcement problem is resolved by an indirect
transaction with banks as intermediaries. The importer does not directly pay the exporter, but
ﬁrst pays the amount CLC to a local bank. The bank cooperates with a bank in the country of
the exporter. The latter guarantees payment upon proof of delivery. Thus the exporter knows
for certain that the payment will be made, but only receives it after production and delivery. In
the case of LCs the participation constraint of the importer is binding. The optimal payment










(1 + r)(1 + r∗)
R − K. (3)
Note that as pre-ﬁnancing takes place on both sides the interest rates from both markets
aﬀect proﬁts. As enforcement risk is completely resolved, proﬁts are independent of the enforce-
ment parameters λ and λ∗.
Comparison At this point, before an explicit demand structure is imposed, some statements
on the optimality of the diﬀerent payment contracts can be made. The four ﬁnancial market
parameters r,r∗,λ,λ ∗ together with the production cost K and sales revenue R determine a
unique ordering of the diﬀerent payment forms as stated below21:
Proposition 1 The optimal choice of payment contract is uniquely determined by the following
21Here I assume K and R to be exogenous and the same for all payment contracts. When introducing an
explicit demand in the next section, diﬀerent payment contracts imply diﬀerent optimal levels of K and R.
10three conditions:




λ∗(1 + r∗) − λ(1 + r)
(1 + r)(1 + r∗)(1 − λ)
,
ii) OA ≺ LC ⇐⇒ λ∗(1 + r∗) > 1,




1 − λ(1 + r)
(1 + r)(1 + r∗)(1 − λ)
.
Proof. Follows directly from comparing optimal discounted expected proﬁts, Equations (1)-(3).
Proposition 1 summarizes the diﬀerent eﬀects of the parameters on expected proﬁts under
the diﬀerent ﬁnancing forms. The usage of open account is increasing in enforcement abroad
λ∗ and decreasing in ﬁnancing costs at home r. CIA is more likely to be used if enforcement
at home λ is strong and if ﬁnancing costs abroad r∗ are high. LCs are used if enforcement is
relatively weak (low λ,λ∗) and if ﬁnancing costs are relatively low (low r,r∗).
3 The trade model
In the following I introduce a CES demand structure that is standard in intra-industry trade
models. I analyze the eﬀects of trade ﬁnance at the ﬁrm level in partial equilibrium. This allows
to derive predictions of the model in a trade framework that could be taken to the data.
3.1 Basic Setup
Preferences Assume the following preferences:
U = Qμq
1−μ









Q is a CES basket of a continuum of diﬀerentiated goods and q0 is a homogenous good. There
is a Cobb-Douglas utility function between the homogeneous good and the diﬀerentiated goods
implying constant shares of income spent on diﬀerentiated goods and the homogeneous good,
respectively. The demand for a single variety of the diﬀerentiated good has the standard form:
q(ω)=p(ω)−σPσQ.
11ω denotes a variety of the diﬀerentiated goods. P =

ω∈Ω p(ω)1−σ	1−σ is the price index of the
optimal CES basket. σ>1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties and Q is the total
demand for diﬀerentiated goods.
Technology Labor is the only input factor. Firms in the homogenous goods sector face perfect
competition. They operate a constant returns to scale technology requiring one unit of labor per
unit of output. The homogenous good is freely traded. I only consider equilibria in which every
country produces the homogenous good. This equalizes wages, which I normalize to one making
the homogenous good the Numeraire. In the diﬀerentiated goods sector ﬁrms face monopolistic
competition. Each variety is produced by only one ﬁrm. There is a ﬁxed cost of entry into
the market f. The production of one unit of the diﬀerentiated product requires a units of
labor input. Thus the total labor requirement of a ﬁrm operating and producing quantity q is
l(a)=f +aq. When selling a diﬀerentiated good abroad, a ﬁrm incurs iceberg type trade costs.
In order for one unit of a diﬀerentiated product to arrive in the destination country, τ>1 units
have to be shipped.
3.2 Optimal behavior of ﬁrms
Diﬀerentiated sector Firms in the diﬀerentiated sector maximize their expected proﬁts.
Given CES utility and monopolistic competition ﬁrms optimally do markup pricing. Domestic
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Next, I derive the optimal behavior of ﬁrms on the export market. Optimal proﬁts under all
ﬁnancing forms can be represented by the general expression:
E[Π x]=αR − βK.










αK. Maximizing the original


















The ﬁnance proﬁt factor A fully summarizes the eﬀects of payment contracts on expected
proﬁts and expected quantities at the factory gate. A = 1 corresponds to no ﬁnancing frictions,
which would be the case if r = r∗ = 0 and λ = λ∗ = 1. Then expected proﬁts are the same as
in the standard model. Note that the parameters α and β enter the problem in a multiplicative
form with the value of exports. Thus the model endogenizes some of the variable trade costs of
trade arising from ﬁnancing costs and the enforcement problem.23
Now that the explicit demand structure is deﬁned, I can derive new conditions for the
optimal ﬁnancing forms. The proﬁts and quantities under ﬁnancing form 1 are larger than
under ﬁnancing form 2 iﬀ:
A1 >A 2.
Plugging in the diﬀerent values for α and β delivers:24
Corollary 1 The optimal choice of payment contract is uniquely determined by the following
three conditions:








ii) OA ≺ LC ⇐⇒ λ∗(1 + r∗) > 1 (as before),
iii) LC ≺ CIA ⇐⇒ λ(1 + r)σ < 1.
22E[qx] is the expected quantity at the factory gate, i.e. including iceberg trade costs and taking into account







23It would be interesting to combine the value-dependant variable costs introduced in this model with some
unit-dependent transport costs.
24In the case of CIA the parameters are: α =
λ
1+r∗ and β = λ, under OA α =
λ∗
1+r and β = 1 and und LC
α =
1
(1+r)(1+r∗) and β =1
13Proof. These conditions follow directly from a comparison of expected proﬁts.25
The expressions simplify, but the same factors as in the general case can be identiﬁed: CIA
is more likely to be used if enforcement at home λ is strong and ﬁnancing costs abroad r∗ are
low. OA is more likely used if enforcement abroad λ∗ is strong and ﬁnancing costs at home r∗
are low. LCs are used if enforcement is relatively weak (low λ,λ∗) and if ﬁnancing costs are
relatively low (low r,r∗).
3.3 Payment Contract Switching
Optimal switching An exporter switches payment contract when this maximizes expected
proﬁts. Maximizing expected proﬁts is equivalent to maximizing expected quantities at the
factory gate. In this subsection I discuss how the ability to switch contracts allows a ﬁrm
to mitigate partially adverse eﬀects from ﬁnancial markets. First, note that for any ﬁnancial
variable θ ∈{ r,r∗,λ,λ ∗} there is at least one payment contract under which expected proﬁts,
revenues and quantities are independent of this variable. Thus if there is a deterioration of one
of these variables at some point a ﬁrm will switch its payment contract. There are also pairs of
ﬁnancial variables of which some payment contracts are independent.
Thus there are cases when the possibility of a payment contract switch can at some point
completely mitigate any adverse eﬀects on trade. However, there can be changes in several
ﬁnancial variables for which there is no ﬁnancing form that completely mitigates the eﬀects.
Nevertheless, a switch of payment contract can reduce the impact of ﬁnancial market changes.
Eﬀects of contract switching In the following I illustrate these diﬀerent cases with some
graphs for trade between ﬁrms in diﬀerent countries.26
Figure 2 illustrates the diﬀerence between a change in only one ﬁnancial variable, the eﬀects
of which can be fully mitigated, and a simultaneous change in two ﬁnancial variables, the negative
eﬀects of which cannot be fully eliminated by switching contracts.

























































26All graphs are calculated in partial equilibrium, i.e. keeping foreign demand ﬁxed. In Section 4 the same







In the left graph, rN =1 .02 is constant and only the Southern interest rate varies. The initial
payment contract is Cash in Advance. When the interest rate in the South passes a threshold,
there is a switch of payment contract to Open Account. From that point on changes in the
Southern interest rate do not aﬀect trade volumes. In the right graph, rN = rS − 0.02 is a
constant value below the southern interest rate. Initially both interest rates are low and a
Letter of Credit is used. When both interest rates increase beyond a certain point, there is a
switch to Cash in Advance. Note that the switch reduces the impact of the ﬁnancial changes,
but cannot fully eliminate them.
A switch of payment contract takes place when the ordering of the ﬁnance proﬁt factors A
changes. This is illustrated in Figure 3, which shows the values of proﬁt factors in the experiment
discussed above for the diﬀerent payment forms. Quantities depend only on the factor A speciﬁc
to the payment form actually used, which is the maximum of the three lines.
Here ﬁgure 3
Figure 4 illustrates the case where two ﬁnancial parameters change and it is still possible to
fully eliminate eﬀects on trade from some point onwards. Now enforcement in the South and in
the North and South are changed respectively.
Here ﬁgure 4
In the left graph, λN =0 .98 is constant and only the Southern enforcement probability changes.
For low values of enforcement, Cash in Advance is used. When the enforcement rate in the South
gets very close to the Northern one, then the payment contract is switched to Open Account in
order to proﬁt from the lower interest rate in the North. In the right graph, λN = λS +0.03 is a
constant value above the enforcement value in the South. For low values of enforcement, Letter
of Credit is chosen, which fully eliminates any eﬀect of the enforcement probabilities on trade
quantities. For higher values of enforcement, there is a switch to Cash in Advance and trade
rises with enforcement in the North.
Eﬀects of no contract switching in the short run The ability of an exporter to switch to
a diﬀerent payment contract is important to optimally adjust to the changes in ﬁnancial eﬃcien-
cies and enforcement probabilities. When an exporter is not able to switch payment contracts
in the short run, this has an adverse aﬀect on traded quantities and expected proﬁts. This is
illustrated in Figure 5. In the example, interest rates are relatively low to begin with and a
Letter of Credit is used. Now suppose there is a change in the Northern interest rate. Then at
15some point the exporter would like to switch to Cash in Advance. The solid line represents the
standard case when the ﬁrm can switch contracts. Then reductions in proﬁts and quantities are
limited to about 10 percent. The dashed line represents the case when the ﬁrm is not able to
substitute away and the eﬀect of the interest rate change cannot be mitigated. In the example
the change of 10 percentage points in the interest rates leads to a 30 percent drop in proﬁts and
quantities. Thus the ability to switch payment contracts is crucial for an exporter to mitigate
the eﬀects of adverse ﬁnancial conditions. As a consequence, the time horizon, in which a switch




In the following the trade model is analyzed in general equilibrium. First, the equilibrium is
derived. Second, a numerical example is studied to evaluate the quantitative importance of
payment contracts. Third, some graphs are presented, illustrating additional eﬀects arising in
general equilibrium.
4.1 Equilibrium
Suppose there are two countries H and F.27 As derived in the previous sections, domestic and










with Ai =( αi)σ(βi)1−στ1−σ.
Free entry As in Krugman (1980), a free entry condition pins down both the number and the
size of ﬁrms in equilibrium. It requires that ﬁxed cost of entry have to equal expected proﬁts
from domestic sales and exports:





















1 − AiAj .
Note that due to the Cobb Douglas structure in preferences the expenditure share on diﬀerenti-
ated products is ﬁxed. Thus output in the diﬀerentiated sector, measured in labor, is constant.























(1 − AiAj)2 < 0.
Lemma 1 In the two country trade model exported (domestic) quantities are
i) increasing (decreasing) in proﬁt factor Ai,
ii) decreasing (increasing) in proﬁt factor Aj.
Thus in the two country model domestic quantities are decreasing in the own export proﬁt
parameter A and increasing in the foreign export parameter A∗. Due to the choice of payment
contracts all ﬁnancial parameter r,r∗,λ,λ ∗ can aﬀect both A and A∗. Thus while the eﬀect of the
proﬁt parameters A and A∗ on quantities is unambiguous, no general result can be established
for the eﬀect of the four ﬁnancial parameters on traded and domestic quantities.
Total (expected) quantities at the factory gate are constant:29


















Labor market clearing The number of ﬁrms in both countries is determined by labor market








P = ni(f + aq).









In the following, properties of the model are illustrated using a numerical example. The quan-
titative importance of payment contract switches is evaluated.
Country Types Suppose there are three types of countries. Type I has a very eﬃcient ﬁ-
nancial market and strong enforcement. Type II has a relatively eﬃcient ﬁnancial market, but
enforcement is weak. Type III has a less eﬃcient ﬁnancial market, but relatively strong enforce-























The last expressions can be simpliﬁed to obtain the standard result as stated above.
30For tractability, I assume that the positive expected proﬁts of importers under Open Account do not enter the
demand for diﬀerentiated good. These proﬁts occur under Open Account as only a share of importers fulﬁll the
contract and payment C
OA is limited to be smaller or equal to R. It would be interesting to analyze these ’informal’
proﬁts explicitly in the general equilibrium. This could be relevant for countries with very low enforcement rates.
18here table 1
Optimal Contracts As shown before these country characteristics can be mapped uniquely
into the optimal choice of payment contract for each exporter-importer country combination.
The optimal payment contracts chosen are:
here table 2
The rows correspond to the country type of the exporter, the columns to the country type of
the importer. On the diagonal the countries are symmetric. In this case an exporter would
never choose OA as this is dominated by CIA. Thus given symmetric countries either CIA or
LC is chosen depending on the domestic interest rate and domestic enforcement. For trade
between countries of type II where enforcement is low, LC is chosen, whereas country I and III
choose CIA. Country type II has low enforcement. Therefore, its exporters choose contracts
that circumvent this problem, i.e. OA and LC. The main factor for the choice of an exporter in
a country of type III is the relatively high home interest rate. The only payment contract that
is independent of this interest rate is CIA, which is the dominant payment contract for trade
with all three types of trading partners. Given these payment contracts, traded quantities can
be calculated:
here table 3
To evaluate quantitatively the eﬀects of the choice of payment contracts on trade, two exper-
iments are studied. First, the diﬀerences in trade volumes between the optimal contract and
the worst contract are calculated. Second, the diﬀerences in trade volumes between the optimal
contract and any of the three available contracts are calculated.31
Worst contracts The contracts that minimize quantities and proﬁts for exporter-importer
pairs are:
here table 4
The percentage decreases in quantities relative to the optimal payment contracts are:
here table 5
If, for example, an exporter in a country of type I trading with an importer in country type II
31For both experiments I assume that exporters in the home country are constrained, while exporters in the
country abroad choose the optimal payment contract. I do not report the reverse trade ﬂows (from abroad to
home) here. Nevertheless, they have an impact on price levels and thus on traded quantities of home country
exporters.
19would be forced to use OA instead of CIA, this would reduce the traded quantity by 49.4 percent.
The table shows that the choice of payment contract has a quantitatively important eﬀect on
traded volumes. Furthermore, this eﬀect is heterogeneous across country pairs. Some trade,
like trade between type I countries, does not depend very much on the payment contract in use.
Trade between countries of type II on the other hand, which have low enforcement, beneﬁts
a lot from the ability of exporters to avoid OA. Note that, whether symmetric or asymmetric
countries trade with each other, is not a good predictor of potential losses from non-optimal
payment contracts. Which country-pair combinations proﬁt most from a free choice of payment
contracts depends on the interaction of all four ﬁnancial parameters as shown in the previous
sections.
The percentage decreases in traded quantities relative to the optimal contract if exporters
are forced to use one speciﬁc contract are:
here table 6
4.3 Graphical Illustrations
In the following, additional eﬀects arising in the two country general equilibrium model are
discussed. The experiments shown in Figures 2 to 5 are repeated in Figures 6 to 8. The
dashed lines represent the previously discussed partial equilibrium responses. The solid lines
represent the full general equilibrium results. There are two new general equilibrium eﬀects.
Changes in ﬁnancial eﬃciency and enforcement aﬀect the ﬁnance proﬁt factor A of Northern
exporters and thus their prices and quantities. This has an eﬀect on price level in the South and
thus aﬀects the export decision of Northern exporters. A second eﬀect arises from the Southern
exporters. Their ﬁnance proﬁt factor is also aﬀected by changes in the eﬃciency and enforcement
parameters, altering export quantities and prices and thus price levels. Furthermore, when
ﬁnancial parameters change, exporters in the South might optimally switch payment contracts.
These switches have an impact on the Northern exporters through price levels, too. Note that
the switching decisions of Northern exporters is independent of general equilibrium eﬀects as it
only depends on exogenous ﬁnancial parameters.
Figure 6 illustrates changes in interest rates. It corresponds to Figure 2 in partial equilibrium.
In the left graph, Northern exporters switch from CIA to OA at the same point as before.
Now there is a new eﬀect from a switch by exporters in the South, though. The vertical
20solid line marks the threshold at which they switch their payment contract from LC to CIA in
order to substitute away from the rising Southern interest rate. Now with a further rise in r∗,
Northern exports become relatively more expensive. Thus exports fall steeper than in partial
equilibrium. At the vertical dashed line, the Northern exporters switch as well and all trade
becomes independent of the Southern interest rate.
In the right graph, when both Northern and Southern interest rates rise jointly, there is no
switch by Southern exporters who use CIA. The fall of Northern exports is less steep in general
equilibrium as also Southern exporters are aﬀected by the changes in interest rates. Thus the
relative price of Northern exporters rises less quickly and trade decreases by less than in partial
equilibrium.
Here ﬁgure 6
Figure 7 illustrates changes in enforcement. It corresponds to Figure 4 in partial equilibrium.
In the left graph as before Northern exporters switch from CIA to OA. Exporters in the South
use CIA and do not switch. In the left part of the ﬁgure, the solid line is now decreasing as
Southern exporters become more competitive with a rise in λ∗, i.e. the relative price of North-
ern exporters rises and their quantities decrease. In the right graph, initially exporters in both
countries use a LC and then at some point switch to CIA. Southern exporters do so ﬁrst as the
interest rate in the North is lower. From the point of the switch onwards, they become relatively
more competitive and quantities of Northern exporters decrease. This is the case until Northern
exporters themselves switch to CIA and their sales increase with the further rise of Northern
enforcement.
Here ﬁgure 7
Figure 8 illustrates the case of no contract switching in the short run. It corresponds to Fig-
ure 5 in partial equilibrium. As before, if they can do so in the short run, Northern exporters
switch from LC to CIA. Exporters in the South ﬁrst use CIA and then later switch to OA.
After the Northern exporters switch contracts and before the Southern exporters change their
choice, all exporters use CIA. Then, only exporters in the South are aﬀected by the increase
in the Northern interest rate. This makes Northern exporters relatively more competitive and
their exports rise. When Southern exporters switch as well, trade becomes independent of the
Northern interest rate. If exporters in the North cannot switch contracts, their exports decrease
in the whole range. First, when also exporters in the South are aﬀected by the interest rate, the
decrease is relatively smaller. Then, when Southern exporters switch contracts and their sales
21become independent of the Northern interest rate, the slope of the line representing trade gets
steeper and the competitiveness of Northern exporters deteriorates more quickly.
Here ﬁgure 8
5 Repeated Transactions
In the previous sections the relationship between an exporter and an importer consisted of only
one transaction. Often though, trade relationships are longer lasting, i.e. there is the possibility
that the two trading partners interact again in subsequent periods. Repeated transactions give
rise to a continuation value of a trade relationship, which makes the non-fulﬁllment of a contract
less desirable. In this section I introduce the possibility of repeated transactions between an
exporter and an importer and study under which conditions a simple trigger strategy can be
implemented to improve upon the equilibrium of the one shot game. I ﬁnd that the ability
to sustain a trigger strategy equilibrium increases with enforcement probabilities and with the
survival probability of the trade relationship. Under CIA the ability also increases in the markup
σ
σ−1 and iceberg trade costs τ.
Suppose that trade can happen more than once between two trading partners. Let γ denote
the probability that a given trade relationship can be continued in the next period. That is γ is
the the trade relationship survival rate. As before a match between an exporter and an importer
is analyzed. No new trading relationships are created, i.e. there are no outside options to trade
with another partner.32
CIA First, I analyze the case of Cash in Advance. Consider the following trigger strategy.
The importer pays the full revenue amount discounted by the interest rate, i.e. C = R
1+r∗.I f
the exporter ever fails to deliver, the importer punishes by ending the trade relationship. The
exporter always pays the money and never runs away. The equilibrium exists if the exporter
has no incentive to deviate, i.e. to take the money and not deliver the good. Yet, even when
deviating, with probability λ the exporter is forced to fulﬁll the contract. That is, the higher
the enforcement probability at home, the less likely the exporter does proﬁt from a deviation.
In order for the trigger strategy to be an equilibrium, the value of the relationship for
32It would be an interesting extension to allow for the creation of new relationships via searching and matching.
This would increase the value of the outside option and make it more diﬃcult to sustain a trigger strategy
equilibrium.











1 − (γ/(1 + r))
> (1 − λ)C.
Using CCIA = R















There are diﬀerent factors, which make the condition more likely to hold. It holds more
likely for a higher λ. As the expected gain from a deviation decreases in domestic enforcement,
implementation of the trigger strategy is the easier, the better enforcement. Furthermore, the
trigger strategy equilibrium is easier to sustain when the ratio R/K increases, i.e. when revenues
are relatively large compared to production costs. This is the case when the markup and iceberg
trade costs are higher. Finally, the higher γ, the higher the value of the trade relationship, the
easier it is to implement the trigger strategy.34
OA Under OA the relevant deviation is by the importer. When OA is used an importer has





In a trigger strategy equilibrium the importer has to receive at least as large expected proﬁts as in
the one shot game. The equilibrium considered is as follows: The importer always pays amount
C. If the importer ever fails to pay the amount, the exporter stops the relationship. First note
that for the importer to have positive expected proﬁts, the payment C has to be strictly below
the revenues R for any λ∗ < 1. The amount C that makes the importer indiﬀerent between
adhering to the trigger strategy equilibrium and deviating is characterized by:
33



































σ−1τ delivers the result.
34Note that so far only one speciﬁc trigger strategy is considered. In future research, it would be interesting to

















This condition corresponds to the equilibrium chosen by the exporter, who has all negotiation
power. It determines the highest incentive compatible C and thus maximizes expected proﬁts













The amount increases in the survival probability γ and the enforcement probability abroad
λ∗. Under OA a trigger strategy always improves on the one shot game whenever γ>0. To see
this note that the expected payment in the one shot game is λ∗R. The expected payment under













This condition can be simpliﬁed to obtain γ>0.35
LC versus other Payment Contracts As shown above, under the discussed conditions,
trigger strategies can improve upon one shot equilibria in the cases of CIA and OA. A LC
on the other hand already resolves all enforcement problems. Trigger strategies can thus not
improve upon the one shot equilibrium in this case. As a result, the introduction of trigger
strategies and repeated transactions makes CIA and OA more attractive while leaving the LC
unaﬀected, implying a worsening of the relative attractiveness of LCs. This is especially the case
when transaction horizons are long, characterized by high relationship survival probabilities γ,
and when enforcement probabilities λ and λ∗ are high. Thus long lasting relationships and
trade between countries with high enforcement imply a higher usage of trigger strategies and
less reliance on the LC.
Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2009) ﬁnd that trade credit intensive industries are not more
strongly aﬀected by the ﬁnancial crisis than others. This ﬁnding might be explained by the
presence of both one shot equilibria and repeated games equilibria in the data. Inter-ﬁrm trade
credit usually corresponds to CIA and OA. The model predicts that these two payment contracts
35
λ
∗ < 1 −
γ
1+r∗(1 − λ
∗) ⇔ 1 > 1 −
γ
1+r∗
24are used more intensively when trigger strategies can be implemented more easily. In a successful
trigger strategy equilibrium, only one ﬁnancial variable aﬀects the traded quantities, i.e. r∗ for
CIA and r for OA. Thus trade credit intensive industries, which use relatively more CIA and
OA, should be less aﬀected by shocks to ﬁnancial markets than industries that rely more on the
LC.36
6 Implications of Endogenous Payment Contracts
6.1 Financial and Economic Turmoil
In the following I analyze the eﬀects of diﬀerent forms of ﬁnancial and economic turmoil on
trade proﬁts and quantities.
Enforcement and Country level risk Suppose that the enforcement probability λ is a
combination of national risk and individual ﬁrm level risk. National risk corresponds to risk
of expropriation, risk of sovereign or bank level default while individual risk is the probability
that a speciﬁc contract is enforced. The important diﬀerence between the two is that banks
are only aﬀected by national risk. Before, a Letter of Credit could fully resolve the problem of
enforcement for the exporter. Now, with national risk, the only way to fully mitigate changes in
λ is to switch to Open Account. Let overall risk be the product of national risk and individual
contract risk:
λ = λNλI
Given this, trade ﬁnance reacts diﬀerently depending on the source of the enforcement prob-
lems. An decrease of enforcement at the contract level in the exporter’s country implies a shift
towards Open Account or Letter of Credit. A decrease in the importer’s country contract en-
forcement leads to a shift towards Cash in Advance and Letter of Credit. An increase in national
risk, however, cannot be solved by switching to a Letter of Credit. In this case an exporter can
only switch to Open Account and an importer can only switch to a Cash in Advance to fully
eliminate the eﬀect of domestic enforcement problems. In the following I discuss diﬀerent types
of turmoil that can be observed in reality and elaborate on some predictions of the model.
36Trade using a trigger strategy is less aﬀected by changes in ﬁnancial parameters as long as the trigger strategy
equilibrium can be sustained, i.e. as long as changes in parameters to not lead to a breakdown of the trigger
strategy equilibrium.
25Interest rate changes There are two potential sources of interest rate changes. First, due
to events that might take place outside the two trading countries, the world interest rate rw
can change, moving both interest rates simultaneously. Second, there can be some problems of
banks in one or both of the countries so that their eﬃciency parameters ϕi change, which aﬀects
interest rates.37 The eﬀect of these changes crucially depends on the time horizon in which ﬁrms
are able to switch their payment contracts. If they are fully ﬂexible in their choice of payment
contracts, then the eﬀects of interest rates changes are captured by Figure 2 as discussed above.
If ﬁrms are not ﬂexible in the short run, the eﬀects of interest rate changes might be stronger as
shown in Figure 5. If an exporter can change the payment contract in the time horizon studied,
then a unilateral change in the interest rate can, from some point on, be fully mitigated while a
change in both interest rates cannot. If there is a short run inability to switch contracts, then
we should not observe a diﬀerential eﬀect of unilateral and multilateral changes in interest rates.
Contract level enforcement changes As introduced above there are enforcement problems
at the national and at the contract level. From these two, the national risk seems to be more
susceptible to turmoil. The individual contract enforcement is mainly determined by legal
institutional factors, which should in general not change in the short run.38 Yet, perceived
national risk like sovereign default or expropriation probabilities can change relatively quickly.
As discussed above, national risk cannot be mitigated by a Letter of Credit. Thus the only way
two trading partners can react to a deterioration in national risk in one of the two countries,
is to switch to the one contract that is not aﬀected by this change: Open Account in case of a
deterioration in the exporter country and Cash in Advance in case of a worsening in the importer
country. Note, though, that this depends on the eﬀect of changes in national risk on the interest
rate in the aﬀected country. An increase in sovereign default could imply a proportional increase
in the national interest rate. That is, the risk free interest rate would then be scaled up by the
national risk. In this case no contract switching is possible to mitigate the eﬀect. However,
any deviations from a proportional change in interest rates to changes in national risk allow
improvements through the choice of the optimal payment contract.
37For details on r
w and ϕi see the interest rate model in Appendix B.
38If one would extend the individual contract enforcement by factors changing expected ﬁrm level insolvency
and illiquidity this would be diﬀerent. Then, an economic crisis in a country could change contract fulﬁllment
expectations at the ﬁrm level.
266.2 Trade Patterns
One aspect of trade that has been analyzed are diﬀerences in trade ﬂows and trade volumes
between developed countries, between developed and developing countries and between develop-
ing countries. Taking into account that for trade both the ﬁnancial conditions in the importer
and exporter country are relevant can help explain diﬀerences in trade patterns. A model that
looks at exporter ﬁnancial markets only can e.g. not predict diﬀerences between South-South
and South-North trade as a result of ﬁnancial conditions. All diﬀerences in such a framework
would be attributed to the demand side of trade. The new feature of my model, namely, that
the importer’s ﬁnancial market and enforcement conditions matter, leads to the following two
propositions about trade volumes, export participation and importing country conditions:
Intensive margin
Proposition 2 For given domestic ﬁnancial conditions r,λ and foreign demand conditions
P∗ and Q∗, exports of a ﬁrm increase in foreign ﬁnancial market conditions.
i) strictly if both r∗ decreases and λ∗ increases
ii) weakly if r∗ decreases or λ∗ increases
Proof. See Appendix A.
Exports of a country increase if the ﬁnancial conditions in the country it is exporting to
improve. Thus, in order to predict trade ﬂows, it is not suﬃcient to look at ﬁnancial market
conditions in the country of the exporter alone, but one has to take into account the conditions in
both countries jointly. Analyzing payment contracts allows to understand how these conditions
interact and inﬂuence trade quantities.
Extensive margin Similar eﬀects arise in a model with an extensive margin, where ﬁrms
decide whether to export or not to another country. To see this suppose for this paragraph that
there is a ﬁxed cost fx of serving a foreign market, which has to be incurred by any ﬁrm which
wants to export. Then a ﬁrm will only export if the expected proﬁts from entering the foreign
market are at least as large as the ﬁxed cost that have to be incurred. Suppose that the ﬁxed
cost can be ﬁnanced without any additional ﬁnancial problems. Then:
Proposition 3 For given domestic ﬁnancial conditions r,λ and foreign demand conditions
P∗ and Q∗, a ﬁrm is more likely to export if foreign ﬁnancial market conditions are better.
27i) strictly if both r∗ decreases and λ∗ increases
ii) weakly if r∗ decreases or λ∗ increases
Proof. See Appendix A.
Not only do trade volumes depend on the conditions in ﬁnancial markets in the countries of
the exporter and the importer, but also the decision of ﬁrms to export, the extensive margin.
That is, the probability of exporting cannot be fully predicted by conditions in the ﬁnancial
market of the exporter. Conditions in the ﬁnancial market of the importer play a role, too.
6.3 FOB Prices
Given per unit cost a and iceberg transportation costs τ, diﬀerent payment contracts imply
diﬀerent FOB prices. To see this, note that from before the agreed on payment amounts C
diﬀer by payment contract, i.e.:
CCIA =
λ
1+r∗RCIA,C OA = ROA,C LC =
RLC
1+r∗.









The following payment amounts corresponding to FOB prices can be derived:
CCIA = λ(1 + r∗)−σ˜ r, COA =( λ∗)σ−1(1 + r)1−σ˜ r, CLC =( 1+r)1−σ(1 + r∗)−σ˜ r,
with ˜ r = τ1−σr∗
d.
From this it can be seen that the amounts speciﬁed to be payed for the traded goods vary
with ﬁnancial market parameters in a systematic way. Depending on the payment form used
ﬁnancial parameters aﬀect FOB prices diﬀerentially. In an empirical analysis of FOB price data
it might thus be relevant to control for diﬀerences in payment contracts. Estimates regarding
FOB prices and ﬁnancial indicators might otherwise be biased.
287 Conclusions
In this paper I propose a new theory explicitly modeling the choice of diﬀerent payment con-
tracts in international trade. I analyze the trade-oﬀs taken into account by an exporter choosing
between these diﬀerent forms of payment, determined by enforcement probabilities and ﬁnanc-
ing costs. The model shows that the choice of payment contracts is quantitatively important.
Financing decisions of trade transactions are driven by factors in the ﬁnancial markets of the
exporter and the importer. The ability to freely choose and switch between payment contracts
is central for ﬁrms to adapt to diﬀerent constellations of ﬁnancial conditions in diﬀerent country
pairs and over time. Limiting this choice can reduce traded quantities signiﬁcantly, increase
prices, and reduce the ability of exporters to react to short term ﬂuctuations in ﬁnancial condi-
tions.
The model maps enforcement probabilities and ﬁnancial market eﬃciencies of an exporter-
importer country pair into an optimal payment contract. In a richer model that could be brought
to the data one might want to include extensions concerning heterogeneity both in the ﬁrm and
in the product dimension. Product diﬀerences could imply diﬀerent degrees of enforceability
in court or diﬀerent time horizons of trade relationships (high or low γ). Firm diﬀerences in
size could aﬀect relative negotiation power between the exporter and the importer, the ability to
enforce contracts in court, the ability to punish deviations from a trigger strategy and the ability
to switch contracts in the face of ﬁxed costs. Another extension would be to explicitly introduce
currencies and to study the interaction of the payment contract decision with exchange rate
risk. This would give a suitable framework to study diﬀerent aspects: ﬁrst, which new eﬀects
arise from payment contracts for the optimal decision in which currency to price exports, and
second, how this aﬀects the transmission mechanism of international shocks.
There is little data available on the usage of the diﬀerent payment contracts across countries,
ﬁrms and time. To assess the model empirically, available ﬁrm level data, that does not contain
direct evidence on payment contracts, could be used to test predictions of the model. Further-
more, a new data set on payment contracts could be built to directly test for determinants of
the choice of payment contracts.
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33A Proofs
Proposition 1 Proof. The statement is true for trade measured both in expected quantities











Taking partial derivatives delivers the following signs for A = ασβ1−σ:
CIA OA LC
A = ασβ1−σ (1 + r∗)−σλ (1 + r)−σ(λ∗)σ ((1 + r)(1 + r∗))
−σ
∂A/∂r∗ − 0 −
∂A/∂λ∗ 0 + 0
As σ>1 the expression for revenues ασ−1β2−σ delivers the same signs:
CIA OA LC
ασ−1β2−σ (1 + r∗)1−σλ (1 + r)1−σ(λ∗)σ−1 ((1 + r)(1 + r∗))
1−σ
∂A/∂r∗ − 0 −
∂A/∂λ∗ 0 + 0
If r∗ decreases, both quantities and revenues increase under CIA and LC. If λ∗ increases,
quantities and revenues increase under OA.
Proposition 2 Proof. The extensive margin is determined solely by expected proﬁts. Thus





Thus proﬁts are monotonously increasing in A. This combined with the partial derivatives
above proves Proposition 2.
34B Interest rates
Suppose the importer and the exporter are in a small open economy and take the world interest
rate rw as given.In both countries there is a competitive sector of ﬁnancial intermediation. Due
to technological and legal diﬀerences, the eﬃciency of the intermediation technology of banks in
diﬀerent countries can diﬀer. The intermediation technology displays constant returns to scale.
Let ϕi ≤ 1 be the eﬃciency of banks in country i for handling transactions, such that the cost of
lending one unit is 1/ϕi. Zero proﬁt implies that the interest rate of a country charged to a ﬁrm
is ri = rw
ϕi . Thus both interest rates change with changes in rw. Furthermore, the interest rate
of a country changes with the eﬃciency parameter ϕ. This parameter captures both short - and
long-run eﬀects. When there is ﬁnancial turmoil in a single country and the domestic interest
rate rises, this is captured by a change in ϕ in that country.
When extending the model to the two types of enforcement problems, national and contract
level, the interest rate in a country will likely react to the former, i.e. the risk free world interest
rate will most likely be scaled up, reﬂecting national default risk. Let γ be the transmission factor
measuring the eﬀect of changes in national risk on the local interest rate. That is, ri = rw
(λN)γϕi.
If γ = 0, then national risk has no eﬀect on the interest rate. If on the other hand γ = 1, the
interest rate perfectly adjusts to any changes in national risk.
C Tables
Table 1: Country Types
Country Type I II III
λ 0.99 0.85 0.97
1+r 1.02 1.03 1.08
Table 2: Optimal Payment Contracts
from / to I II III
I CIA CIA OA
II OA LC OA
III CIA CIA CIA
35Table 3: Traded Quantities
Country I II III
I 2.94 2.9 2.6
II 2.76 2.64 2.53
III 3.02 2.93 2.45
Table 4: Worst Payment Contracts
from / to I II III
I L CO AL C
II CIA OA CIA
III LC OA LC
Table 5: Optimal vs. Worst Payment Contract, percentage changes of quantities
from / to I II III
I -8.0 -49.4 -19.4
II -9.3 -44.6 -23.2
III -27.4 -59.2 -26.3
Table 6: Optimal vs. Only 1 Payment Contract, percentage changes of quantities
Only CIA Only OA Only LC
from / to I II III II I I I I II I I I I
I 0 0 -12.8 -3.6 -49.4 0 -8.0 -7.8 -19.4
II -9.3 -4.9 -23.2 0 -44.6 0 -4.5 0 -19.2











Figure 1: Source: IMF World Economic Outlook
Figure 2: The eﬀect of a change in interest rates on North-South trade ﬂows. Solid line: traded
quantities. Vertical dashed line: change of payment contract.
37Figure 3: The eﬀect of a change in interest rates on the ﬁnance proﬁt factor A. Vertical dashed
line: change of payment contract.
Figure 4: The eﬀect of a change of enforcement probabilities on North-South Trade ﬂows. Solid
line: traded quantities. Vertical dashed line: change of payment contract.
Figure 5: Percentage eﬀect of a change in the interest rate in the North on North-South trade
ﬂows with and without payment contract change. Dashed line: trade change with contract
change. Solid line top: trade change without contract change. Vertical dashed line: change of
payment contract.
38Figure 6: The eﬀect of a change in interest rates on North-South trade ﬂows, GE versus PE.
Vertical dashed line: change of contract foreign exporter. Vertical solid line: change of contract
domestic exporter. Solid line: traded quantities general equilibrium. Dashed line: traded
quantities partial equilibrium.
Figure 7: The eﬀect of a change of enforcement probabilities on North-South trade ﬂows, GE
versus PE. Vertical dashed line: change of contract foreign exporter. Vertical solid line: change
of contract domestic exporter. Solid line: traded quantities general equilibrium. Dashed line:
traded quantities partial equilibrium.
39Figure 8: Percentage eﬀect of a change in the interest rate in the North on North-South trade
ﬂows with and without payment contract change in general equilibrium. Vertical dashed line:
change of contract foreign exporter. Vertical solid line: change of contract domestic exporter.
Dashed line: trade change with contract change. Solid line: trade change without contract
change.
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